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LABOR LAW

INTRODUCTION

During the last year, the Tenth Circuit interpreted several federal labor
statutes. It addressed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN)' and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).2 The court also
considered preemption of various state and common law remedies under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).3
This Survey begins with a detailed examination of Frymire v. Ampex
Corp.4 Frymire presented the Tenth Circuit with its first opportunity to address provisions of WARN.' Among the numerous issues involved, the court
set forth its interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations and the calculation of back pay, issues which other circuits have not treated consistently.
Part II of this Survey discusses three cases in which the Tenth Circuit examined issues affecting compensation calculation under the FLSA. In Henderson
v. Inter-Chem Coal Co.,6 the court reviewed the analysis used to determine
whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor for FLSA
purposes.' In Reich v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.,8 the Tenth Circuit clarified
the analysis used to determine the types of activities that constitute compensable work time within the meaning of the FLSA. 9 Finally, in Aaron v. City of
Wichita," the court addressed the method of calculating the "regular rate of
pay"" used to compute overtime and the exemption of certain employees
from FLSA overtime requirements.'2 Part III examines the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of ERISA preemption of various statutory and common law remedies. The court in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund'3
held that ERISA did not preempt statutory provisions exempting disposable
earnings from garnishment when state law does not sufficiently relate to the
benefit plan.' 4 Additionally, in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage,"
the Tenth Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt a medical malpractice
claim targeted at a health maintenance organization. 6
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29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
Frymire, 61 F.3d at 761.
41 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1994).
Henderson, 41 F.3d at 567-71.
38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125-26.
54 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1995).
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1994).
Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655-59.
39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).
Guidry, 39 F.2d at 1083-86.
59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 153, 155.
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I. THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT 7

A. Background
In response to what Congress perceived as unhealthy and demoralizing
work force reductions by employers," it enacted the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN). Congress designed WARN to give state
and local governments, unions, and workers the time necessary to react and
adjust to reductions in the work force. 9 WARN prohibits employers with one
hundred or more employees2" from "closing" a plant 2' or instituting a "mass
layoff' 22 without giving written notice to each affected employee or the
employee's representative at least sixty days prior to the action.23 Violations
of WARN subject employers to civil liability24 and fines.25

17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
18. Jeffrey Turner, Comment, Damages Under the Workers Adjustment and RetrainingAct
(WARN): Why Damages Cannot Be Based on Calendar Days, 12 COOLEY L. REV. 197, 201
(1995).
19. Id.; see Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining and Notification (WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT &
LAB. L. 1, 3 (1993).
20. The statute defines the affected employer as "any business enterprise that employs-(A)
100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or (B) 100 or more employees who in the
aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of overtime)." 29 U.S.C. §
2101(a)(1).
21. The statute defines a "plant closing" as
the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more
facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in
an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or
more employees excluding any part-time employees.
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2).
22. The statute defines a "mass layoff" as
a reduction in force which--(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and (B) results in an
employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for-(i)(I) at
least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees) and (II) at least
50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or (ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3).
23. The provision states:
An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day
period after the employer serves written notice of such an order-(l) to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice or, if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee; and (2) to the State dislocated worker
unit (designated or created under title III of the Job Training Partnership Act [29 U.S.C.
§ 1651 et seq.]) and the chief elected official of the unit of local government within
which such closing or layoff is to occur.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
24. WARN provides:
Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of section 2102 of
this title shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss as
a result of such closing or layoff for--(A) back pay for each day of violation at a rate of
compensation not less than the higher of--(i) the average regular rate received by such
employee during the last three years of the employee's employment; or (ii) the final
regular rate received by such employee ... [sluch liability shall be calculated for the
period of the violation, up to a maximum of 60 days, but in no event for more than onehalf the number of days the employee was employed by the employer.
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The language of WARN leaves ample room for conflicting interpretations.
The circuit courts have inconsistently treated the issues of the appropriate
statute of limitations and the calculation of back pay. In passing WARN, the
legislature did not incorporate an express statute of limitations.26 The 1990
Implementation Act created a four-year federal statute of limitations applicable
to federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.27 Having no retroactive
effect, the Implementation Act does not apply to WARN actions.28 WARN
limitation periods vary among the circuits from six months to six years, depending on whether that circuit chose to use an analogous federal or state
statute.29
The Supreme Court, in North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,30 attempted to
address the dispute between the circuits regarding the applicable WARN limitations period." In North Star, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit's holding
that the period of limitations for WARN actions should be borrowed from
state law.32 Because the federal statute failed to specify a limitations period
for the cause of action, the Court, consistent with its settled practice,33 borrowed from the state law.34 An exception is made to this practice only when
the state limitations period would interfere with or frustrate the underlying
policies and implementation of the federal statute.35 The Court, however, declined to provide guidelines for determining the most applicable type of state
limitations periods.36 Subsequent to the North Star decision, several circuit
courts which had previously mandated a federal limitations period (specifically
the NLRA statute of limitations) vacated and remanded pending cases for
further consideration. 3
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
25. WARN provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 2101 of this title with respect to a
unit of local government shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $500 for
each day of such violation, except that such penalty shall not apply if the employer pays
to each aggrieved employee the amount for which the employer is liable within three
weeks from the date the employer orders the shutdown or layoff.
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3).
26. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 1927, 1929 (1995).
27. The Implementation Act states, "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not
be commenced later than four years after the cause of action accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1658; see also Kimberly J. Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation Period with Real Limitations, 69 IND. L.J. 477, 503 (1994) (discussing the Implementation Act's
failure to specify a federal limitations period for civil rights actions under pre-existing statutes).
29. Norwood, supra note 28, at 501-02.
30. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
31. North Star, 115 S. Ct. at 1930.
32. Id.
33. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989) (holding that state personal
injury statutes govern limitations period for Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (stating that the state personal injury limitations period
governs civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
34. North Star, 115 S. Ct. at 1931.
35. Id. at 1930-31.
36. The Supreme Court recognized the appellate court's identification of four state limitations periods: a two-year period for general civil penalties, a three-year period under a state wage
payment and collection law, a four-year period for contract breaches, and a six-year residual statute of limitations. Id at 1931.
37. United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. granted

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Carpenters District Council v.
Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,38 addressed the other unsettled issue of calculating back pay damages. 39 The Fifth Circuit, after examining the statutory
language and legislative intent, determined that back pay damages should be
based upon work days instead of calendar days.' The court noted that the
traditional notion of back pay connotes a sum of money which would put the
employee in as good a position as he would have been had the employer not
violated WARN." The Fifth Circuit determined that this calculation of back
pay aligned with Congress's intent to award damages under WARN equal to
the wages an employee would have received had he not been laid off.42
B. Frymire v. Ampex Corp.

3

1. Facts
Ampex Corporation (Ampex) designs, manufactures, and markets electronic audio and visual recording products." Although headquartered in California, it maintained facilities in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where the plaintiffs were employed.45 Two wholly owned subsidiaries, Ampex Recording
Systems Corporation (RSC) and Ampex Video Systems Corporation (VSC),
shared the Colorado Springs facility.' Ampex separated RSC and VSC,
which were previously housed in the same building, into two separate adjacent
buildings.47
In September 1990, approximately six months after Ampex separated the
subsidiaries, the company informed its employees that it would be conducting
a work force reduction in the coming months.' In a November 1990 update,
Ampex notified its employees that approximately 350 employees would be laid
off.4 In January 1991, Ampex issued immediate termination notices to the
plaintiffs.5" Carolyn Frymire and eighty-four other employees brought a

and vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2272 (1995); Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir.
1994), vacated per curiam, 56 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995).
38. 15 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
39. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1282-86.
40. Id. at 1285-86.
41. Id. at 1283 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
42. Id. at 1284-85 (citing S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1987)). The court
adeptly hypothesized possible unfair results where
[e]mployee "A" is a full-time employee who works a regular eight-hour shift each weekday. However, employee "B" is a part-time employee who works just one ten-hour shift
each Saturday. Under the Third Circuit's calendar-day approach, employee "A" would
receive 480 hours pay in lieu of notice (eight hours per day times sixty days), while the
part-time employee "B" would receive 600 hours pay (ten hours per day times sixty
days).
Id. at 1285.
43. 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
44. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 761.
45. Id. at 761-62.
46. Id. at 762.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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WARN action against Ampex Corporation for failing to provide the requisite
notice."
The trial court granted Ampex's motion for summary judgment with respect to the RSC employees.52 The court held that the two facilities were separate sites of employment; therefore, the number of RSC employees fell below
the WARN threshold requirement. 3 With respect to the group employed by
VSC, the court denied Ampex's motion for summary judgment, finding that
group's number met the WARN threshold.54 Subsequently, the court denied
Ampex's motion for reconsideration and granted class certification to the
plaintiffs."
At trial, the court found that Ampex had violated WARN's notice requirement and assessed damages, postjudgment interest, and attorneys fees.56 On
appeal, Ampex raised six issues: (1) whether the action exceeded the NLRA
six-month statute of limitations and was thus time-barred;57 (2) whether the
VSC and RSC facilities constituted separate sites or a single site of employment;5" (3) whether Ampex should have its damages reduced via "good faith"
mitigation;59 (4) whether Ampex should have its damages set off by the

51. Id. at 761.
52. Id. at 762.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1081, 1083-87 (D. Colo. 1994).
57. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 763.
58. Id. at 764-65. The Tenth Circuit relied on rules promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
Id. at 765-66. The pertinent rule states:
(i) Single site of employment. (1) A single site of employment can refer to either a
single location or a group of contiguous locations. Groups of structures which form a
campus or industrial park, or separate facilities across the street from one another, may
be considered a single site of employment .... (3) Separate buildings or areas which
are not directly connected or in immediate proximity may be considered a single site of
employment if they are in reasonable geographic proximity, used for the same purpose,
and share the same staff and equipment .... (4) Non-contiguous sites in the same geographic area which do not share the same staff or operational purpose should not be
considered a single site .... (5) Contiguous buildings owned by the same employer
which have separate management, produce different products, and have separate
workforces are considered separate single sites of employment.
20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i) (1995).
The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that VSC and RSC could be considered
two separate employment sites for WARN purposes. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 766-67. The court considered the criteria of proximity, contiguity, and, to a lesser extent, the dissimilarity of products.
Id.
59. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 767. WARN provides:
If an employer which has violated this chapter proves to the satisfaction of the court that
the act or omission that violated this chapter was in good faith and that the employer
had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of this
chapter the court may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of the liability or penalty
provided in this section.
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(4).
The Tenth Circuit found that Ampex had a good faith belief that its conduct did not violate
the WARN notice requirement. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 768. The court concluded that liability therefore should have been reduced pursuant to § 2104(a)(4) by the lower court. Id. at 768-69. At a
minimum, the "good faith" defense requires proof of the employer's subjective intent to comply
with WARN and proof of the employer's objective reasonable belief that its conduct also complied. Id. at 767-68.
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amount of voluntary severance benefits provided to the discharged employees;' (5) whether the district court erroneously used calendar days instead of
work days for calculating back pay damages;6' and (6) whether the plaintiff's
award of prejudgment interest was barred by WARN's "exclusive remedies"
provision. 61
2. Decision
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in North Star Steel v.
Thomas,63 the Tenth Circuit held that the lower court correctly applied
Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for contract claims.' The court
noted the split in the circuits regarding WARN causes of action65 and the
North Star Court's refusal to decide which state limitations period applied.'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding on the limitations
period on three grounds. First, the goal of uniformity would be furthered if a
"universally recognized cause of action, such as a contract action" were borrowed for WARN purposes. 67 Second, the employer-employee relationship
and the WARN remedy of back pay most closely resembled an implied contract and the remedy for a breach thereof.' Third, the court noted that other
circuits have supported the use of state contractual limitation periods.'
The court also acknowledged a circuit split on the issue of whether work
or calendar days should be used in calculating back pay damages.7" The court

60. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 769. The Tenth Circuit held that Ampex could not set off payments
made under its "pay in lieu of notice" policy. Id. at 770. The court upheld the lower court's finding that such payments represented a binding contractual obligation to pay benefits having no setoff effect on WARN. Id. However, the court found that the lower court should have considered
monies paid under the policy in calculating good faith reductions of Ampex's liability. Id. at 77071.
61. Id. at 771.
62. Id. at 773. WARN states that "the remedies provided for in this section shall be the
exclusive remedies for any violation of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b). The circuit court found
that while WARN contains an exclusive remedies provision, it also contains a nonexclusive remedies provision. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 773. WARN states in relevant part:
The rights and remedies provided to employees by this chapter are in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies of the employees,
and are not intended to alter or affect such rights and remedies, except that the period of
notification required by this chapter shall run concurrently with any period of notification required by contract or by any other statute.
29 U.S.C. § 2105.
Given the apparent ambiguity in the statute, the court looked to the congressional purpose.
Frymire, 61 F.3d at 773. The Tenth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which provides for
allowance of interest on civil case money judgments awarded, in conjunction with WARN's nonexclusive remedies provision, evinced Congress's intent not to preclude prejudgment interest. Id.
63. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
64. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 763.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 764.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 246 (5th Cir. 1994) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 57 (2d
Cir. 1993) (stating that state statutes of limitations should be applied).
70. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 772. The Fifth Circuit applied work days in Carpenters Dist. Council
v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1282-86 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933
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examined the language of the text,7 as well as the legislative history of
WARN, but found little clarification.72 Because the Tenth Circuit had never
addressed the method for calculating back pay damages, it looked to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Dillard for guidance. The court agreed with the Fifth
Circuit and concluded that using work days rather than calendar days to calculate back pay damages more appropriately reflected the purpose of WARN. 4
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of WARN in Frymire reflected sound
policy and demonstrated consistent reasoning. The court correctly applied
contract theory to the statute of limitations, mitigation, and back pay calculation issues, but some flaws exist. By preventing Ampex from setting off
payments under its "pay in lieu of notice" policy,75 the court diminished the
employers' incentive to comply with the purpose and intent of WARN notice
requirements. On the other hand, by holding that work days should be used in
calculating back pay damages,76 the Tenth Circuit eliminated some potential
for unjust enrichment.7
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in North Star, a concern with
any federal court's decision with respect to the statute of limitations in a
WARN action is the lack of consistency and predictability nationally. A federal statute of limitations would alleviate this problem. Under the current
scheme, with circuit courts selecting appropriate state statutes of limitations,
multi-state employers must be wary of potential plaintiffs who may avail
themselves to venues that possess longer state limitations periods.
D. Other Circuits
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to discuss
which limitations period to apply in WARN actions.78 The Second Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's analytical framework set forth in Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson9 to identify the proper limitations

(1995). In contrast, the Third Circuit applied calendar days in United Steelworkers of America v.
North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 41-43 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
72. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 771-72.
73. Id. at 772 (citing Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1275).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 770.
76. Id. at 772.
77. But see Turner, supra note 18, at 222 (noting an inconsistency in basing the state's civil
fine upon calendar days, while basing workers' damages on work days).
78. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1993). The defendant, Specialty Paperboard, terminated all 232 employees of its mill and sold the
mill the same day to the co-defendant, Rock-Tenn Company. Id. at 52. On the same day, RockTenn rehired 141 of the employees. Id. The employees' union filed a class action suit under
WARN on behalf of the laid-off employees against both the selling and purchasing companies. Id.
The union claimed that the companies' actions violated notice requirements. Id.
79. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

period when the statute is silent."0 In such a situation, the court should borrow the local statute of limitations most analogous to the instant situation, so
long as it does not undermine federal goals."'
The circuits reflect a more dramatic split on the calculation of damages
when an employer fails to give sufficient notice in contravention of WARN. 2
The dispute centers on the interpretation of § 2104 of WARN, which states
that the employer is liable to the employee for "back pay for each day of
violation ... up to a maximum of [sixty] days." Only two circuits addressed this issue prior to Frymire, both reaching different conclusions. The
Third Circuit in United Steel Workers v. North Star Steel Co."4 found that
damages should be based upon calendar days. 5 In Carpenters District Council v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,86 the Fifth Circuit declared that damages should be calculated on the basis of work days. 7 The Supreme Court declined to settle this dispute between the circuits by denying certiorari in
Dillard.8' As the issue percolates within the circuits, the potential exists for
varying interpretations of the WARN damages calculation provision.
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938:89 OVERTIME COMPENSATION
CALCULATION

A. Background
Relevant sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) set compensation requirements for overtime hours worked by employees. 9' The FLSA did
this in an attempt to remedy low wages and long hours that endangered
workers' health. 9' In 1985, a sharply divided Supreme Court in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority expanded the statute's reach, stating
that state and local governments would now be held accountable to FLSA requirements. 93
FLSA overtime requirements apply only to employees, and not to independent contractors.94 In Dole v. Snell,95 however, the Tenth Circuit stated

80. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 53.
81. Id. (citing Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355).
82. See Turner, supra note 18, at 199-201.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
84. 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994).
85. North Star, 5 F.3d at 42.
86. 15 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 933 (1995).
87. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1286.
88. 115 S.Ct. 933 (1995).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
90. The statute provides that an employee who works longer than 40 hours shall be paid at
least one and a half times her regular pay rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
91. Kimberly A. Pace, What Does It Mean to Be a Salaried Employee? The Future of PayDocking, 21 J. LEGIs. 49, 52 (1995).

92. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
93. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
94. The FLSA defines an employee as "any individual employed by an employer." 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The FLSA further defines an employer as
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that the degree and nature of the employer's control determines the status of
the worker, not solely the employer's classification.96 The Dole court stated
that the economic realities of the relationship governed whether an individual
is an "employee. '97 Under the FLSA, an employer must pay one and one-half
times the employee's "regular rate of pay for each hour worked over forty
hours per week." ' However, the FLSA exempts managerial and professional
employees from the overtime requirements."
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co."°
a. Facts
The defendant companies, Inter-Chem Coal Company, Nationwide Mining, Inc., and Brent Nations, employed Henderson to repair and maintain
equipment.' ' Henderson filed suit against the companies seeking unpaid
overtime compensation pursuant to the FLSA 3 2 The evidence indicated that
although the defendant companies exerted little control over him, Henderson
was economically more dependent on the companies than not. 3 The district
court granted summary judgment for the companies after holding that
Henderson was an independent contractor." Henderson appealed the decision."'

any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization
(other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or
agent of such labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
95. 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989).
96. Dole, 875 F.2d at 805.
97. Six factors comprise the economic reality test:
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the
worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in the business; (4)
the permanence of the working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform
the work; and (6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged
employer's business.
Id.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(l). The exemption may have been partly prompted by the notion
that managers and professionals possessed sufficient bargaining power as to make such governmental protection unnecessary. Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the Managerial-ProfessionalEx.
emption of the Fair Labor StandardsAct, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 139, 141 (1993).
100. 41 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1994).
101. Henderson, 41 F.3d at 570.
102. Id. at 569.
103. Id. at 570. Defendants provided affidavits showing that while they informed Henderson
about what equipment needed to be fixed, Henderson chose the manner of repair. Id. He did no
other type of mechanical work for the companies and possessed his own specialized tools and
truck. Id. However, Henderson worked almost exclusively for the defendant companies, which
paid him by the hour. Id. The working relationship between Henderson and the companies
spanned approximately three years and four months. Id. Lastly, the companies called on
Henderson for equipment repair work as needed, not solely on specific projects. Id.
104. Id. at 569.
105. Id.
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether Henderson was an independent contractor, thus precluding summary
judgment."° The court recognized that the FLSA definitions of "employer"
and "employee" expanded the boundaries of traditional agency law principles." The court, therefore, did not limit its inquiry into the employment
context by relying on contractual terminology or common law concepts of
"employee" or "independent contractor."' 0' The court instead applied the
economic reality test, which classifies employment based on economic dependence upon the principal entity."° The totality of the circumstances determines the characterization." ' The Tenth Circuit noted that because material
issues of fact remained, the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment."' The court outlined three findings a lower court must make as the
trier of fact. First, the district court must determine the historical facts surrounding Henderson's work." 2 The next step is to analyze the six factors of
the economic realities test.' Third, the district court must determine whether or not the individual is an "employee" under the FLSA."'
5

2. Reich v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc."1
a. Facts

Iowa Beef Packers (IBP) slaughters, processes, and packs meat
throughout the Midwest." 6 In accordance both with its own internal policies
and with OSHA and USDA regulations, IBP required its employees to wear
certain garments and safety equipment on the job."7 The trial court found
that there were two types of hourly production workers, those who used cutting utensils in their jobs and those who did not." 8 Both categories of workers wore special white outergarments." 9

106. Id. at 570-71.
107. Id. at 570 (relying upon Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)).
108. Id.(citing Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1989)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 571.
112. Id.
113. Id. For a list of the six factors, see supra note 97.
114. Id.
115. 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
116. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1124.
117. The knife-wielding/meat-cutting workers wore garments and special safety equipment
which included "a mesh apron, a plastic belly guard, mesh sleeves or plastic arm guard, wrist
wraps, mesh gloves, rubber gloves, polar sleeves, rubber boots, a chain belt, a weight belt, scabbard and shin guards." Id.The second category of workers wore gear such as hard hats, earplugs,
safety footwear, and safety eyewear. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.at 1125.
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Under § 17 of the FLSA 20 the Secretary of Labor brought an action
against IBP seeking to enforce the overtime and recordkeeping provisions.' 2 '
The Secretary argued that the time employees spent putting on, taking off, and
storing the safety equipment between shifts constituted compensable work time
under the FLSA.'22 IBP countered that the tasks were preliminary and postliminary activities that were noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947.123

The trial court agreed in part with both parties. It initially granted a
restitutionary injunction, having determined that part of the contested work
24
time for the knife-wielding workers was "hours worked" under the FLSA.
The trial court, however, later vacated the injunction and certified for appeal
the question of whether the FLSA required retroactive application of the injunction."' The parties appealed the issues of 26determining compensable
hours and issuance of the restitutionary injunction.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's determination of compensable work time,127 but provided a different justification. 2 The court
reasoned that time spent by the second category of workers did not constitute
FLSA compensable time because that activity failed to reach the level of mental or physical exertion that defines "work.' 29 The court defined work as a
physical or mental exertion, whether burdensome or not, which the employer
controls or requires of the employee, and which is pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer. 3

120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
121. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1124.
122. Id. at 1125.
123. Id. The Portal-to-Portal Act provides that
no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ... on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee
minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of
any of the following activities of such employee ....(1) walking, riding, or traveling to
and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which
such employee is employed to perform, and (2) activities which are preliminary to or
postliminary to said principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to the time
on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the
time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.
29 U.S.C. § 254 (1994).
124. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The lower court found that the time consumed in donning, doffing, and storing the
protective gear by the knife-wielding workers was compensable because of the "integral and indispensable" part it played in the performance of the principal activity, meat cutting. Reich v. Iowa
Beef Packers, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1315, 1326 (D. Kan. 1993).
128. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125.
129. Id. at 1125-26.
130. Id. at 1125 (relying on Tennessee Coal Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 598 (1944)). The circuit court also noted that such work could also be qualified as de minimis as a matter of law. Id. at 1126 n.l.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

The court also agreed with the lower court's initial grant of a
restitutionary injunction. 3' IBP's "good faith reliance defense"'' necessarily failed because IBP did not rely upon either a written opinion issued by the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor or
upon any other valid basis.'33 The Tenth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's
standard for judging the district court's discretion to implement a restitutionary
injunction. 34 The court examined the purpose of the FLSA and determined
that it seeks to secure full compensation due hourly workers for their
labor. 33 The court also affirmed the lower court's initial holding that knifewielding workers should be paid on the basis of a reasonable time to put on
and remove gear, rather than the actual time taken, in order to account for the
documented "wait-and-walk time" which is not compensable.'36
3. Aaron v. City of Wichita.37
a. Facts
Wichita firefighters sued the City of Wichita (City) for wages due under
the FLSA. 38 The firefighters claimed that the City improperly calculated the
"regular rate" of pay used to compute overtime and impermissibly exempted
certain employees from FLSA overtime requirements.'39
The firefighters alleged that the City had violated FLSA provisions by
failing to pay for sleep and mealtime hours, improperly exempting Division
Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Captains from overtime requirements, and using
an overstated number of hours to create an artificial hourly rate of pay. " In

131. Id. at 1125.
132. The defense is found in the Portal-to-Portal Act, which states:
[N]o employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the
failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ... if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United
States specified in subsection (b) of this section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he
belonged.
29 U.S.C. § 259 (1994).
133. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1126.
134. "'While a restitutionary injunction need not issue as a matter of course upon a finding of
past wages due, the district court's discretion to deny the injunction where it makes such a finding
is severely limited and must be exercised with an eye to the purposes of the act."' Id. (quoting
Donovan v. Grantham, 690 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1982)).
135. Id. at 1127.
136. Id.
137. 54 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1995).
138. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 653.
139. Id. at 654.
140. Id. With respect to the rank and file firefighters, the International Association of Fire
Fighters and the City had bargained for a written Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which
contained pay schedules indicating fortnight salaries and hourly rates. Id. The salaries and hourly
pay were based upon a 56-hour work week. Id. The City arrived at the "regular rate of pay" by
dividing the salary by the 112 bi-weekly hours (which included some overtime hours). Id. The
firefighters argued that the "regular rate of pay" should have been calculated by dividing the salary by the number of non-overtime hours worked, which would in effect raise the regular rate of
pay. Id.
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its summary judgment order, the district court denied the unpaid hours claim,
but found for the firefighters on the other claims.' 4'
b. Decision
In regard to the issue of the regular rate of pay, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the dispute hinged on the number of hours the union-bargained
salaries were intended to cover.'42 The court stated that the lower court's
holding clearly conflicted with FLSA regulations which allow the use of base
salaries in calculating a regular rate to cover more than forty hours in one
week.'43 The Tenth Circuit further stated that the lower court misinterpreted
149 Madison Avenue Corp. v. Asselta'" in holding that the City's method of
calculation was improper.'45 The court explicitly held that the base salary
should be divided by the total number of hours worked if the designated base
salary intentionally covers overtime hours, in order to avoid calculating a rate
that would not fairly represent the "normal, non-overtime workweek."'"
The Tenth Circuit noted that the FLSA exempts any employee in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity from its overtime requirements. 47 Using the two-pronged short test found in the federal

141. Id. The district court held that the City incorrectly calculated the regular wage as a
matter of law because overtime hours could not be used in finding the regular rate of pay. Id.
142. Id. at 655. The firefighters argued that the MOA salaries were intended to cover nonovertime hours only, while the City contended that the salaries were intended to cover some overtime hours. Id.
143. Id. The court set forth an example from the regulations:
If an employee whose maximum hours standard is 40 hours was hired at a fixed salary
of $275 for 55 hours of work, he was entitled to a statutory overtime premium for the
15 hours in excess of 40 at the rate of $2.50 per hour (half-time) in addition to his salary, and the statutory overtime pay of $7.50 per hour (time and one-half) for any hours
worked in excess of 55.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 778.325 (1993)).
144. 331 U.S. 199, modified, 331 U.S. 795 (1947) (holding that regular rate of pay equaled a
non-overtime work week).
145. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655-56. The Supreme Court has held that the regular rate of pay represented the rate actually paid for the "normal, non-overtime workweek." 149 Madison Avenue, 331
U.S. at 204. However, the implication of the Court's statement was not to forbid the use of overtime hours in calculating the regular rate, but rather to state that "the object of that computation is
to determine what rate was being paid for the non-overtime workweek unaffected by any inflated
rate paid for overtime work hours." Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655-56.
146. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 656. The Tenth Circuit then turned to new issues raised by the
firefighters concerning the incorporation of "Kelly days" in the rate calculation and whether the
rate accurately represented the parties' intent. The court found that "Kelly days" were another
form of paid vacation, and were thus properly included in the regular rate of pay calculation. Id.
The court found the contractual intent issue without merit. Id.
147. The relevant section provides, "The provisions of section[] 206 .. .and section 207 of
this title shall not apply to-(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative
or professional capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 213(1) (1994).
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regulations," the court held that the City had satisfied the initial salary
prong of the test. 49
Federal regulations consider an employee "salaried" if his paycheck consists of a predetermined amount which is not subject to reduction due to fluctuations in quality or quantity of the work performed. 5 ° The Tenth Circuit
noted the varying treatment between other circuits of the salary prong. 5' The
court adopted neither analysis of the salary prong because the City's policy
allowed for deductions in accrued leave for absences of less than one day" 2
and it did not dock pay for days missed.'53 The court found no additional
support for the firefighters' contention that the captains' and chiefs' additional
compensation for overtime hours,'54 together with paystubs showing the
number of hours covered in the pay period,' undermined the determination
that the City paid the captains and chiefs on a salary basis. 56
The Tenth Circuit found that a genuine issue of material fact did exist
concerning the duties prong of the short test.'57 Because the lower court erroneously concluded that the captains and chiefs were not salaried, it never
reached findings of fact concerning the duties prong. 5 In order to satisfy the
duties prong of the short test, an employee's primary duties must consist of

148. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (1994). The regulation states that "executive-exempt" status is given
to an employee who
is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate of not less than ... $250 per
week ... and whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which
the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision
thereof, and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more
other employees therein ....
Id.
149. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 659.
150. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
151. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 658. A number of circuits have held that where the employer penalizes
an employee with lost pay for absences of less than one day, the employees are not salaried, and
therefore not covered by the executive exemption. See Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6,
11 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905 (1992); Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1990). Other
circuits have held that unless the employer actually docks the pay, the employee is salaried and
therefore still under the aegis of the executive exemption. See McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999
F.2d 293, 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1993); York v. City of Wichita Falls, 944 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir.
1991); Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union v. City of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805 (11th Cir.
1991).
152. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 657.
153. Id. at 658.
154. Id. The court relied upon federal regulations stating that compensation in addition to
salary is not inconsistent with the employee's salary status. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(b)
(1994)).
155. Id. The court found that tallying hours was a simple accounting function. Id.
156. Id. at 659.
157. Id.
158. Id. The firefighters had argued, regarding the captains and chiefs, that they exercised
little independent judgment or discretion; they had no authority in personnel decisions; they had
no authority to transfer, or raise or reduce pay; and they had no authority to make policy judgments, spending decisions, or equipment modifications. Id. The firefighters also argued that the
battalion and division chiefs' work consisted of mostly clerical duties and that they were expected
to perform with the rank and file in responding to emergencies. Id. The City argued that the captains and chiefs spent more than 80% of their time managing subdivisions of the fire department
and that they possessed supervisory power commensurate to the position. Id.
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managing the enterprise, department, or subdivision, and include the "customary and regular direction of the work of two or more employees."' 59 The
Tenth Circuit directed the lower court to determine whether the employee
spent more than fifty percent of his time performing management functions in
order to be characterized as executive." 6
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit succinctly and accurately dealt with the definition of
"employee," the definition of "work," and the principles behind calculating the
FLSA regular rate of pay. The court's failure, however, to choose between the
competing analyses that control the salary prong of the executive exemption
may lead to future difficulties.
The court's failure to dictate a controlling analysis does not advance the
goals of predictability and fairness. Employers in the Tenth Circuit will continue to operate without a definitive rule upon which they may base their business decisions. Furthermore, the court's omission raises another issue. The
court based its decision not to choose an analysis on the fact that the City of
Wichita's policy dealt with deductions in accrued leave. 6' The Tenth Circuit
did not address whether FLSA compensation encompasses accrued leave.
Federal regulations state that an executive's compensation cannot be subject to
reduction.'62 If the employee's predetermined compensation includes accrued
leave, it follows that deductions would undermine the salary prong of the
executive exemption.'63
D. Other Circuits
In Carrel v. Sunland Construction, Inc., 64 the Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs were not employees in an examination of the employee/independent
contractor distinction.165 The court relied on a five-factor economic realities
test very similar to the Henderson test."6 The court determined that the

159. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (1994)).
160. Id. (citing Department of Labor v. City of Sapulpa, 30 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1994)). The
Tenth Circuit noted that in the event the captains and chiefs were found to spend less than 50% of
their time on managerial tasks, the trial court must still apply a four-factor analysis to determine
whether they may be considered executive. Id. The four factors a trial court must examine are:
"(1) the relative importance of management as opposed to other duties; (2) the frequency with
which the employee exercises discretionary powers; (3) the employee's relative freedom from
supervision; and (4) the relationship between the alleged exempt employee's salary and the wages
paid to other employees for similar nonexempt work." Id.
161. Id. at 658.
162. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
163. Pace, supra note 91, at 58-59; see also Robert D. Lipman etal., A Call for Bright-Lines
to Fix the Fair Labor Standards Act, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 357, 358 (1994) (noting that the
salary prong of the executive exemption test is too rigid to accurately account for paid leave policies).
164. 998 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1993).
165. Carrel, 998 F.2d at 334. Sunland Construction employed welders for pipeline construction projects and considered them to be independent contractors. Id. The welders generally worked
60 hours per week. Id. at 332.
166. Id. The court said the five factors were
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economic realities supported Sunland's classification of the workers as independent contractors.'67
With regard to executive exemptions under the FLSA, the District of
Columbia Circuit held in Kinney v. District of Columbia'" that D.C.
firefighters failed the salary prong of the short test and therefore were protected by FLSA overtime requirements. 69 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the critical issue was whether the employees are "subject to"
docking of their pay for partial absences. 7 ° By contrast, the Eighth Circuit,
in McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 7 ' held that employees retain their executive
status unless the employer actually docks the employees' pay.'
7
III. EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 19741 1

(ERISA) PREEMPTION
A. Background
Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in response to the rapid growth in size and scope of employee benefit plans. 7 4 The legislature designed ERISA to provide consistent federal
regulation and minimum benefits vesting and funding requirements. 75 To ensure uniformity, Congress inserted a preemption clause mandating that the
statute "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.' ' 6 The Supreme Court expansively
interpreted the phrase "relate to," stating that any connection or reference to an
employee benefit plan sufficiently draws ERISA concerns.' 77 In District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,'78 however, the Court tempered the broad scope of the provision by holding that the preemption will not
79
apply to state laws of general applicability.

the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer, the extent of the relative investments of the worker and alleged employer, the degree to which the worker's opportunity
for profit and loss is determined by the alleged employer, the skill and initiative required
to perform the job, and the permanency of the relationship.
Id.
167. Id. at 334. The court found in part that the welders worked on a "project by project,
company to company" basis, that they were highly skilled, that Sunland controlled none of the
methods or details of the welding work, and that the welders provided their own equipment. Id.
168. 994 F.2d 6 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
169. Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11.
170. Id.
171. 999 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994).
172. McDonnell, 999 F.2d at 296.
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
174. 29 U.S.C § 1001(a).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
177. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). For a discussion of the "relates
to" standard, see Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the Age of Managed Care, 62 DEF. CotNs. J. 191, 197 (1995) (concluding that despite the wealth of ERISA
preemption cases, there is no definitive test for determining whether a state law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan).
178. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
179. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130 n.1.
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund8 '
a. Facts
Guidry, a judgment debtor of the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association (Union), sought to recover ERISA retirement benefits from the
Union.'' After failing to impose a constructive trust on Guidry's pension
benefits, s2 the Union tried statutory garnishment to collect its judgment." 3
The district court held that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions protected
Guidry's pension fund benefits from garnishment,8 4 just as the provisions
had protected against a constructive trust in Guidry 15
On remand, the Tenth Circuit panel reversed the district court, stating that
Guidry I did not control because that case did not present the issue of postpayment garnishment. 6 In the remanded case,8 7 Guidry additionally argued that Colorado law restricting garnishment applied to his pension benefits. 8 Although it held that ERISA did not bar post-payment garnishment,
the Guidry H court also held that ERISA preempted Colorado law restricting
garnishment to twenty-five percent of disposable earnings.8 9 Guidry appealed for rehearing en banc.

180. 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).
181. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1081. From 1964 to 1981, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local No. 9, employed Guidry as its chief executive officer. Guidry v. National Sheet
Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Colo. 1986). In 1982, Guidry
pleaded guilty to embezzling $377,301.53 from the Union and served prison time. Id. The Union
never recovered the embezzled money. Id. The Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund and
the Local Unions and Councils Pension Plan denied Guidry's subsequent request for early retirement benefits. Id.
182. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1081. On prior review, the Supreme Court held that ERISA prohibited assignment or alienation of pension benefits. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension
Fund, 493 U.S 365, 371-72 (1990) [hereinafter Guidry 1].
183. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1081. The parties agreed to channel all disputed pension payments
into a single bank account in Denver, Colorado. Id. The funds thereby became subject to a single
writ of garnishment for the purposes of this suit. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Guidry 1,493 U.S. at 375-76 (1990)).
186. Id. (citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 10 F.3d 700, 717 (10th Cir.
1993)).
187. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Guidry 11].
188. Id. at 713. Guidry argued that two Colorado statutes exempted garnishment of pension
benefits in whole or in part. One statute provides 75% exemption: "Except as provided ... the
maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is
subjected to garnishment or levy under execution or attachment may not exceed ... twenty-five
percent of the individual's disposable earnings .... " COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-54-104(2)(a) (Supp.
1995). Another statute provides complete exemption:
Property, including funds, held in or payable from any pension or retirement plan or
deferred compensation plan, including those in which the debtor has received benefits or
payments, has the present right to receive benefits or payments, or has the right to receive benefits or payments in the future and including pensions or plans which qualify
under the federal "Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" as an employee
pension benefit plan ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(1)(s) (Supp. 1995).
189. Guidry I1, 10 F.3d at 713.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

b. Decision
On rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Guidry 11's primary
holding, reasoning that the anti-alienation provision of ERISA does not bar
garnishment of private pension benefits once they are received by the beneficiary."9 The Tenth Circuit, however, also concluded that ERISA does not
preempt Colorado law, which exempts seventy-five percent of disposable
earnings from garnishment. 9' The court held that total exemption under section 13-54-102(l)(s) of the Colorado statute was not available because the
92
underlying writs were filed before the effective date of the statute.
The court noted that ERISA preemption occurs when the state law "relate[s] to any employee benefit plan."' 93 The Tenth Circuit explained that the
parameters within which a state law relates to an employment benefit plan
should be construed expansively' 94 insofar as there exists a connection or
reference to a benefit plan,'" and regardless of whether the law indirectly affects the plan.' 96 The court conceded, however, that ERISA does not preempt
state law if only a tenuous connection exists. 97 The Tenth Circuit held that
where the Colorado statute did not relate to ERISA pension plans, 98 no preemption occurred. 99
2. Pacificareof Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage2"
a. Facts
Originally filed in state court, Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage2"
involved a medical malpractice claim." 2 Pacificare, the defendant health
maintenance organization, argued that ERISA preempted Burrage's state law
claims and successfully removed the action to federal court.20 3 The district
court found that ERISA preempted only one of the state law claims, dismissed
it, and remanded the remaining two claims to state court.2

190. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1083.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1084.
193. Id. at 1083 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)).
194. Id. at 1083-84 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)).
195. Id. at 1083 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
196. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130
(1992)).
197. Id. at 1084 (quoting Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 125, 130 n.1).
198. Id. at 1084-85. The Tenth Circuit found it significant that the statute, while including
pension or retirement benefits, does not specifically refer to ERISA pension plans or benefits. Id.
at 1085.
199. But see Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988)
(holding that ERISA preempted where a state statute identified ERISA welfare plan benefits for
protection under state garnishment law).
200. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
201. Pacificare,59 F.3d at 151.
202. Id. at 152.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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The remaining claims charged that Pacificare was liable for the malpractice of one of its physicians and that Pacificare should be held vicariously and
directly liable for loss of consortium.2 '5 Pacificare petitioned for a writ of
mandamus to the district court to rescind its order remanding the two claims
to state court and to decide that ERISA preempted those claims."° The dispute hinged upon whether the state law medical malpractice claim related to
the Pacificare plan, an employee benefit plan. 7
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit denied Pacificare's petition for writ of mandamus,
holding that the state claims did not relate to employee benefit plans and,
therefore, were not preempted by ERISA.08 The court acknowledged that no
circuit had yet addressed ERISA preemption of HMO malpractice actions and
that there existed a division in the district courts. 2"
As noted previously, a law relates to an employee benefit plan if it refers
to such a plan. 20 The Tenth Circuit identified four categories of law which
"relate to" employee benefit plans: (1) laws regulating the type of benefits or
terms of ERISA plans; (2) laws creating reporting, disclosure, funding, or
vesting requirements for ERISA plans; (3) laws providing rules governing the
calculation of benefit amounts under ERISA plans; and (4) laws and commonlaw rules providing remedies for misconduct arising from the administration of
ERISA plans."' The Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court's determination that the malpractice claim did not involve the HMO plan's administration of benefits or the level or quality of benefits promised. 22 The Tenth
Circuit disposed of the loss of consortium claim: because the claim hinged
23
upon Pacificare's vicarious liability, it did not trigger ERISA preemption. ,
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Guidry walks a precarious line. Although
the reasoning seems sound and persuasive, and protects the legal rights of
judgment debtors, the decision may provide perverse incentives for law-breakers. 214 The court's ruling provides lawbreakers with largely ungarnishable
pension benefits, even in the event of a successful criminal prosecution.
The medical malpractice claim against Pacificare of Oklahoma is representative of the nationwide tide of lawsuits filed against health maintenance

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 154.
208. Id. at 153.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 154 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
211. Id. (quoting National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992)).
212. Id. at 155.
213. Id.
214. See Guidry, 39 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1995) (Brorby, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority's holding mandates a bizarre result).
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organizations nationwide."' With such lawsuits comes the issue of ERISA
preemption. The Pacificare analysis indicated that factual posturing is critical
in determining whether ERISA preemption follows.2 6 As some commentators have observed, if the claim against the health benefit plan subject to
ERISA derives from a decision to limit or deny coverage, ERISA likely will
2' 7
preempt state law.

D. Other Circuits
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Corcoran v. United Healthcare,
Inc.," 8 addressed a medical malpractice claim brought against a health plan
administrator, United Healthcare." 9 The court noted the congressional intent
to broadly extend ERISA's reach.220 Based upon its findings that United
Healthcare dispensed medical advice in the context of making determinations
regarding the availability of benefits under the health insurance plan, the Fifth
Circuit held that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim.22 '
In Spain v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,"' a case similar to Corcoran, the
Ninth Circuit also found that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' wrongful death
claim against an employee benefit plan administrator.223 The plaintiffs argued
that Aetna's delay in authorizing a bone marrow transplant negligently caused
the death of Steven Spain, the plaintiffs' husband and father.224 Citing the
established premise that ERISA should be applied expansively,225 the Ninth
Circuit stated that ERISA preempted common law claims based upon improper
administration of health benefits.226 The court stated that the plaintiffs' state
law action directly related to the administration of ERISA plan benefits.227
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided many significant labor law
and employment cases during the last year. In Frymire v. Ampex Corp.,228
the court found that the three-year contract actions period represented the
appropriate statute of limitations period for WARN actions.2 9 It also held

215. See Conrad & Seiter, supra note 177, at 197.
216. Pacificare,59 F.3d at 154-55.
217. See Conrad & Seiter, supra note 177, at 197; see also Diana J. Bearden & Bryan J.

Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L.
REV. 285, 339 (1995) (concluding that ERISA will likely not preempt common law medical malpractice claims).
218. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
219. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321, 1323.
220. Id.at 1328-29 n.ll.
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that actual work days rather than calendar days should provide the basis for
WARN back pay awards.23°
In Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co.,"' the Tenth Circuit reiterated the
analysis for determining the employee/independent contractor distinction for
FLSA purposes.232 The court in Reich v. IBP, Inc.,233 held that "physical or
mental exertion" best defines compensable work under the FLSA.234 In
Aaron v. City of Wichita,235 the Tenth Circuit determined that base salaries
which covered more than forty hours in a week could be used for calculating
the regular rate of pay for FLSA overtime purposes. 236 The court also clarified the analysis used to determine when the FLSA executive exemption applied.237
In the area of ERISA preemption, the Tenth Circuit decided two significant cases. In Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,238 the
court held that ERISA did not preempt statutory garnishment protections.239
In Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage,24 the court further found that ERISA
did not preempt a medical malpractice claim against a health maintenance
organization.'
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